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FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 2 SPRING 1974 NUMBER 2
THE DECEPTIVE AND UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES
ACT: A NEW APPROACH TO TRADE REGULATION
IN FLORIDA
ROD TENNYSON*
I. INTRODUCTION
On June 7, 1973, Governor Reubin Askew signed into law
House Bill 1915, the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices
Act.' This new law, nicknamed the "little FTC" Act (because it was
patterned after the Federal Trade Commission Act 2), initiated a new
approach to consumer protection and trade regulation in Florida. This
article will discuss the background and legislative history leading to
the passage of the Act, explain the provisions of the Act and examine
the Act's anticipated effect on trade practices in Florida.
II. BACKGROUND AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
In September 1972, the Governor's consumer advisor received a
federal grant to conduct a study of consumer market problems in
Florida. The study was completed and a report submitted with a
number of conclusions and recommendations. 3 One general conclu-
sion was that Florida's consumer protection laws were primarily
criminal statutes with few, if any, civil remedies.4 The report also
found that criminal sanctions provide minimal protection for the con-
sumer because of the nature of consumer transactions and the difficulty
of proving criminal intent beyond a reasonable doubt.5 The study
concluded that most Florida laws regulating trade practices consisted
of licensing provisions, the enforcement of which was supervised by
boards or commissions composed of members of the regulated industry.
License revocation or suspension, however, was a sanction rarely im-
* Member, Florida Bar. B.M.E., Georgia Institute of Technology, 1969; J.D., Uni-
versity of Florida, 1972. The author was a member of the Governor's staff that drafted
the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act. The views expressed in the
article, however, are those of the author personally and do not reflect the views of the
State of Florida.
1. FLA. STAT. §§ 501.201-.213 (1973).
2. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1970).
3. 1 A. ENGLAND, F. JONES, T. LANG, R. PERKINS, C. RICHARDS, R. SELLARS, R. TENNY-
SON & J. YOUNG, CONSUMER AFFAIRS IN FLORIDA: A REPORT TO GOVERNOR REUBIN O'D.
ASKEW (1973) [hereinafter cited as ENGLAND REPORT].
4. See id. at 133-36.
5. Id. at 138.
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posed by the boards or commissions on their fellow industry members
to police unfair or deceptive trade practices.6 The report therefore
recommended that the legislature consider adopting a "little FTC"
act, giving strong civil enforcement remedies to the Attorney General,
to the state attorneys and to private citizens to curtail deceptive and
unfair trade practices in the Florida marketplace.7
Before the 1973 legislative session opened, the Governor's office
had drafted an entirely new "Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices
Act" for the state. The draft was submitted to the Attorney General's
staff and to the House Subcommittee on Consumer Protection" for
their suggestions and recommendations. The bill was also prefiled in
the Senate, but no independent action was ever taken by the Senate.,
The first draft of the bill (H.B. 1915) was modeled after the Uni-
form Consumer Sales Practices Act, the Unfair Trade Practice and
Consumer Protection Act and the Federal Trade Commission Act.'0 A
full text of the Florida Act, from first to final version, appears as an
appendix to this article."
The language incorporated into the first draft was that proposed by
the Uniform Consumer Sales Practices Act: A "deceptive act or prac-
tice by a supplier in connection with a consumer transaction" shall
be an unlawful activity. This definition was followed by a long list of
examples of deceptive practices. 12 By using the terms "deceptive," "con-
sumer transaction" and "supplier," the uniform act provision would
have limited the new law to the area of consumer protection. The Sub-
committee on Consumer Protection, its staff and the Governor's staff
later decided to broaden the bill by adopting the language of the
Federal Trade Commission Act." They concluded that the bill should
6. See tables, id. at 123-32.
7. Id. at 313.
8. The House Subcommittee on Consumer Protection, with chairman Representa-
tive John Forbes, was created under the House Committee on Business Regulation,
chaired by Representative Bill Andrews. The bill was introduced to the legislature as
a committee bill by the Committee on Business Regulation.
9. Senate Bill 1159 (1973) failed even to leave the committee, FLA. S. JouR. 956
(1973), and all efforts to ensure passage were concentrated on the companion house
bill, H.B. 1915 (1973).
10. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1970).
11. See pp. 251-57 infra. The appendix includes typographical markings to indicate
changes made in the bill during the legislative process. Citations to the appendix will
refer to the section number as the provision appears in the 1973 Florida Statutes.
12. UNIFORM CONSUMER SALES PRAcTIcEs Acr § 3. See appendix § 501.204.
13. Federal Trade Commission Act § (5)(a)(l), 15 U.S.C. § 45 (a)(l) (1970), provides:
"Unfair methods of competition in commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or prac-
tices in commerce, are declared unlawful." The federal Act requires the unlawful ac-
tivity to be "in commerce" under the commerce clause of the federal Constitution, while
the Florida Act inserts the phrase "in the conduct of any trade or commerce" in its
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protect both consumers and businessmen from all unfair trade prac-
tices. The full committee adopted this recommendation and favorably
reported the bill out of committee on April 27, 1973.
After passing the House of Representatives,' the bill was assigned
to the Commerce Committee in the Senate. This committee voted
to change the word "unfair" in section 501.204 to "fraudulent." This
amendment would have jeopardized effective use of the established
precedents under the Federal Trade Commission Act, as the same
wording of the federal Act would not have been adopted. The bill was
further amended on the Senate floor, however, and the term "unfair"
was reinserted and became a permanent feature of the Act.15
III. PROVISIONS OF THE "LITTLE FTC" ACT
A. Unlawful Activities
The language of section 501.204 is broad enough to cover almost
any activity in the marketplace, including antitrust matters and re-
straint of trade activities.1 6 Subsection (2) of this section gives a more
precise definition of "unfair" or "deceptive" by stating the legislative
intent to adopt the established precedents of the numerous federal
decisions under the Federal Trade Commission Act 7 as the standard to
be used in defining "unfair" and "deceptive.""'
Because most businessmen and consumers have little knowledge
of the meaning of "unfair" and "deceptive" as established by the de-
cisions of the Federal Trade Commission, the legislature found it
necessary to give rule-making authority to the executive branch to
codify, in rule form, the meaning of those terms. 9 Previously, the
declaration of unlawful activity. Since the Florida law was passed under the state's
police power, no showing of interstate commerce need be made in applying the Act.
14. FLA. H.R. Jout. 516 (1973). The bill passed the House unanimously.
15. FLA. S. JouR. 676 (1973). The bill passed the Senate with only one dissenting
vote.
16. The phrase "unfair methods of competition" has been interpreted to mean a
violation of either the "letter or spirit" of the federal antitrust laws, which include
the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1970), and the Clayton Anti-Trust Act,
§§ 2-3, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-13 (1970). See note 106 infra.
17. FLA. STAT. § 501.204(2) (1973) provides:
It is the intent of the legislature that in construing subsection (1) of this section
due consideration and great weight shall be given to the interpretations of the
Federal Trade Commission and the federal courts relating to § 5(a)(l) of the Federal
Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. 45(a)(1)), as from time to time amended.
18. The standards to test whether a practice is "unfair" or "deceptive" are discussed
in more detail at pp. 237-43 infra.
19. FLA. STAT. § 501.205 (1973) provides:
(1) The department shall propose rules to the cabinet that prohibit with
specificity acts or practices that violate this part and which prescribe procedural
1974]
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legislature's approach to consumer protection problems was to describe
statutorily a deceptive or unfair trade practice and then to declare it
unlawful.2 0  Since the marketplace is quite complicated, it was
easy for any unscrupulous operator to conduct his business affairs in
a manner just outside the statutory proscription and to reap a great
profit before the legislature had time to enact a statute interrupting the
operation. Substantive rule-making authority enables the executive
branch to stop deceptive and unfair activities as they arise by promul-
gating rules to cover the activity; citizens seeking relief are no longer
required to wait for the legislature to convene.
The original draft of the bill assigned the rule-making authority
to the Department of Legal Affairs. 21 As a compromise measure, the
House Subcommittee on Consumer Affairs adopted a provision re-
quiring the Cabinet to approve the rules proposed by the Depart-
ment.22
B. Remedies
To control unlawful trade practice in a complicated marketplace,
it was necessary to provide the enforcing authorities with broad in-
vestigatory powers. Section 501.206 of the Act gives the enforcing
authority subpoena power before a lawsuit is ever filed. With this es-
sential power, the enforcing authority can (upon probable cause)
review a business' records to determine whether a deceptive or unfair
trade practice has been or is occurring.2 3 The enforcing authority
must adhere to the rules of civil procedure when collecting evidence
through depositions and interrogatories, but it does not have to file
suit before using the rules of discovery. 24
rules for the administration of this part. Such rules shall be adopted by majority
vote of the cabinet. All rules prescribed by the cabinet and administrative action
taken by the department shall be pursuant to chapter 120, Florida Statutes. The
attorney general shall, at least thirty days (30) before the meeting at which the
rules are to be considered by the cabinet, mail a copy of such rules to any person
filing a written request with the attorney general to receive copies of proposed
rules. The attorney general may charge a reasonable rate for providing copies of
such rules, which rate shall not exceed the actual cost of printing and mailing.
(2) All substantive rules and regulations promulgated under this part shall
be consistent with the rules, regulations and decisions of the Federal Trade Com-
mission and the federal courts in interpreting the provisions of § 5(a)(l) of the
Federal Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. 45(a)(1)), as from time to time amended.
20. See ENGLAND REPORT 133-46.
21. See appendix § 501.205.
22. This compromise was incorporated into the final bill. See FLA. STAT. § 501.-
205(1) (1973).
23. FLA. STAT. § 501.206 (1973) was adopted from UNIFORM CONSUMER SA.ES ACT
§ 8.
24. FLA. S. JoUR. 676 (1973). The requirement to follow the Florida Rules of Civil
Procedure was an amendment passed on the Senate floor. See appendix § 501.206(1).
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The enforcing authority is given civil remedies to enforce the
Act. It may bring an action for declaratory judgment, an action to
enjoin deceptive or unfair acts or an action to recover damages suffered
by a large class of consumers. 25 Before an action for declaratory judg-
ment or for damages can be initiated by the enforcing authority, it
must first hold an administrative hearing to determine if there is proba-
ble cause for such action. No such administrative hearing is required
if the enforcing authority is seeking injunctive relief in the circuit
court.2 6 In any of these actions, the court, upon motion by the enforcing
authority, may appoint a receiver to distribute a business' assets to
reimburse consumers damaged by that business' unlawful activities.
The court also has the authority to require specific performance of a
consumer transaction and to "strike or limit the application of clauses
of contracts to avoid an unconscionable result, or to grant other ap-
propriate relief."27 For example, once the enforcing authority brings
an action for violation of the Act, it has standing to move that the
court reform unfair, one-sided adhesion contracts or landlord-tenant
agreements.28
Litigation, however, is not the only remedy available to the enforc-
ing authority. It may also accept an assurance of voluntary compliance
from a merchant, which can be conditioned upon restitution to in-
jured consumers.2 9 Like the Federal Trade Commission," the en-
forcing authority also has quasi-judicial administrative enforcement
powers to enjoin anyone from performing unfair or deceptive trade
25. FLA. STAT. § 501.207 (1973).
26. The administrative hearing requirements were added by the House Committee
on Business Regulation to act as a safeguard against frivolous, harassment suits. In
order to provide the enforcing authority a speedy remedy for stopping unlawful prac-
tices, no hearing is required when it seeks injunctive relief. If the enforcing authority
can establish a prima facie case for a violation of the Act, the court should grant a
temporary injunction without the enforcing authority's having to prove the traditional
irreparable harm. See Times Publishing Co. v. Williams, 222 So. 2d 470 (Fla. 2d Dist.
Ct. App. 1969).
27. FLA. STAT. § 501.207(3) (1973). This section was adopted from UNIFORM CON-
SUMER SALES PRAcrIcEs Acr § 9.
28. Such remedies clearly seem included within the purview of "other appropriate
relief" permitted by the language of FLA. STAT. § 501.207(3) (1973). Cf. FLA. STAT. § 817.561
(1973).
29. FLA. STAT. § 501.207(6) (1973) allows the enforcing authority to accept an as-
surance of voluntary compliance from a business that agrees to stop a certain practice.
The business does not have to admit to any wrong-doing in tendering the assurance.
It is important to note that an assurance of voluntary compliance is not a consent order,
and the business' subsequent violation of its own assurance does not subject it to con-
tempt of court penalties or to the civil monetary penalties of FLA. STAT. § 501.208(8)
(1973). Violation of an assurance of voluntary compliance is, however, prima facie
evidence of a deceptive or unfair trade practice.
30. See 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(5) (1970).
1974]
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practices. If the enforcing authority believes a deceptive or unfair
trade practice is occurring, it can serve the offending party with a
complaint requiring him to come forth and, in an administrative
hearing, show cause why an order to cease and desist should not be
entered against him.31 If the hearing officer finds the trade practice
to be in violation of the Act, the respondent in the action can appeal
to the Attorney General for administrative review.3 2 Judicial review
of the Attorney General's decision is available by certiorari to the
appropriate district court of appeal.3 8
The ability to enforce the Act through administrative action may
be the most useful remedy provided. It allows the enforcer and the
businessman to resolve their differences without costly and time con-
suming court appearances. When a county or municipal ordinance
exists which covers the activity complained of, the enforcing authority
may also proceed pursuant to the local ordinance and before local ad-
ministrative bodies. Any appeal from a decision of a local administra-
tive body is taken to the Attorney General with judicial review in the
district courts of appeal. 34 Failure to obey a cease-and-desist order can
result in fines of $5000 per day, which can be collected in a civil
action brought by the enforcing authority. 35 An affected party can
avoid an administrative enforcement action by removing the proceed-
ing to the circuit court. The Senate created this option under the
heading of "Jury Trial,"38 to permit anyone subject to an administra-
tive hearing under section 501.208 directly to obtain circuit court
adjudication of the issues.3 7 The affected party's transfer of the action
31. FLA. STAT. § 501.208 (1973).
32. The cease-and-desist administrative procedure is similar to the procedures of
the Federal Trade Commission except that the Attorney General replaces the Commission
as the final decision-maker in the administrative process.
33. See FLA. STAT. §§ 120.31, 501.208(3) (1973).
34. FLA. STAT. § 501.208(4) was added to encourage county and city governments
to establish local consumer protection agencies to act as hearing officers in administra-
tive hearings. See, e.g., Palm Beach County, Fla., Ordinance 72-2. The broad powers
granted to counties and municipalities by the state constitution and statutes, however,
could have resulted in conflicts with the Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act
unless provision was made to accommodate local ordinances in the enforcement scheme
of the Act. See FLA. CONSr. art. VIII, § 2; FLA. STAT. § 125.01 (1973). Because he must fol-
low the same appeals proceedure from either a state or local hearing, a person accused
of a violation of the Act receives the same administrative and judicial review regardless
of the nature of the proceeding below.
35. FLA. STAT. § 501.208(8) (1973).
36. FLA. STAT. § 501.2091 (1973).
37. FLA. STAT. § 501.2091 (1973) allows the respondent in an administrative action
to have his case tried in the judicial branch. However, he must exercise his option by
actually filing a civil petition or complaint in the circuit court before the hearing
officer renders his decision and order. Once the hearing officer has made his final de-
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to the circuit court changes the cease-and-desist remedy into an equit-
able action in which the enforcing authority seeks to enjoin the al-
legedly unfair or deceptive practice. If the enforcing authority did not
take advantage of the transfer to allege a damage action, the affected
party would not be entitled to a jury trial as a matter of right. 8
Unlike the drafters of the Federal Trade Commission Act, the Flori-
da Legislature felt individuals should have enforcement remedies avail-
able to protect themselves from abuses in the marketplace. 9 Individual
consumers and businessmen are given private remedies notwithstand-
ing any action the enforcing authority has initiated or will initiate.
An individual can bring an action for declaratory relief, injunctive
relief or damages against all alleged violators of the Act.40 To encourage
such civil actions by individual citizens and to protect businessmen
from the expense of defending against frivolous law suits, the prevail-
ing party in a private action is entitled to recoup costs and attorney's
fees. 41 The ability to institute private class actions was eliminated from
cision, the "proceeding" is over even though the Attorney General must still review
his decision. Judicial review then lies with the district courts of appeal. If he so desires,
a respondent should exercise his option to have his case tried in the circuit court prior
to the administrative hearing date.
The ability of a party charged by the enforcing authority to convert the administra-
tive enforcement hearing into a judicial proceeding may be analogized to the civil
defendant's ability in a state court (upon certain conditions) to remove a case to the
federal district court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1970). The differences in the procedures
and remedies between the administrative and judicial proceedings are significant, but
presumably the party charged with a violation of the Act understands the effect of
transfer to the circuit court. Compare FLA. R. Civ. P. passim with FLA. STAT. §§ 120.20-.28
(1973).
38. Presumably the enforcing authority, now required to litigate its case in the
circuit court, could prosecute any action for damages pursuant to the Act. See FLA. STAT.
§ 501.207(l)(c) (1973). In the interest of judicial economy, the affected party may desire
that the enforcing authority consolidate all claims in one action. See FLA. R. Civ. P.
1.010, 1.110(g). Concerning the question of trial by jury, see FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.430.
39. There is no private right of action under the Federal Trade Commission Act,
15 U.S.C. § 45 (1970).
40. FLA. STAT. § 501.211 (1973).
41. FLA. STAT. § 501.211(2) (1973). This section directs the trial judge in his discre-
tion to award the prevailing party attorney's fees and costs based upon the attorney's
actual work on the case. An additional intent of this section was to ensure that attorneys
would be adequately compensated for their efforts on behalf of consumers.
The plaintiff or defendant must lose on the merits of his case before he becomes
liable for the other party's attorney's fees and costs. Losing on procedural or other
technical grounds is not a "judgment in the trial court" as required in this section. See
FLA. STAT. § 501.210 (1973). If a private suit is dismissed on a technicality, each party
would bear its own expenses unless the case is refiled and a judgment finally obtained on
the merits of the case. Note that this section applies only to "consumer transactions" and
would not apply if a non-consumer initiates the private suit. The section does not address
the very common situation in which settlement is made without trial and judgment. In
this situation the parties themselves would have to agree on who is to pay the attorney's
fees.
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the bill while still in committee. Under present Florida and federal
rules and decisions, these suits present difficulties for the litigants in
maintaining the necessary "standing" to prosecute the action.4 2 Al-
though the Act prohibits private class actions, section 501.207 does
allow the enforcing authority to bring a "class action" on behalf of
consumers.
4
C. Special Provisions
Other sections of the Act contain important statements of purpose,
definitions and special exemptions. "Consumer transactions" is de-
fined in the Act to mean the sale of goods and services primarily for
personal, family or household use.44 The term does not include real
property or securities transactions, but does include franchises and dis-
tributorship sales.4 5 This does not exempt real property or securities
transactions from coverage under the Act, however, since the term
"consumer transaction" appears neither in the general declaration of
unlawful activity, section 501.204, nor in the administrative enforce-
ment procedures, section 501.208. Section 501.210, relating to at-
torney's fees and private civil actions, does limit its provisions to "con-
sumer transactions" and may technically exclude real property and
securities transactions as well as other transactions not relating to per-
sonal, family or household use. The term "supplier" includes a manu-
facturer, wholesaler, dealer, debt collection agency or advertising
agency that regularly solicits, engages in or enforces "consumer trans-
actions."4 6 Here again, the term "consumer transaction" is used, thus
limiting a "supplier" to one who deals with consumer goods, services
or intangibles primarily for personal, family or household use. Some-
one who deals exclusively in real property, securities or non-con-
sumer business transactions technically is not a supplier, although
42. See appendix § 501.212. Court interpretations of standing for class actions have
been very strict in Florida. No class action is available unless similar frauds are perpe-
trated on all the members of the class, the fact situation for each fraud is the same
and only one remedy is available to each defrauded person. See, e.g., Lakeland v. Chase
Nat'l Co., 32 So. 2d 833 (Fla. 1947). Federal law requires that each member of the
class allege over $10,000 in damages in order to meet the requirements of 28 U.S.C.
§§1331(a), 1332(a) (1970) for standing in federal court. See Zahn v. International Paper
Co., 94 S. Ct. 505 (1973). Members of the class cannot aggregate their claims to meet
this $10,000 jurisdictional requirement; this effectively excludes most consumer suits
since few single consumer transactions involve $10,000. See Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332
(1969) (interpreting FED. R. Civ. P. 23); Comment, Class Actions-Aggregation Aggrava-
tion, 24 U. MIAMI L. REV. 173 (1969).
43. FLA. STAT. § 501.207(l)(c) (1973).
44. FLA. STAT. § 501.203(1) (1973).
45. This definition was adopted from UNIFORM CONSUMER SALES PRAcTIcEs Act § 2.
46. FLA. STAT. § 501.203(3) (1973).
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such a restricted definition may not have been the intent of the legis-
lature. 47 The term "supplier" like "consumer transaction" is used in
neither section 501.204, which defines unlawful activity, nor section
501.208, which describes the administrative enforcement procedures.
The terms "supplier" and "consumer transaction" were deliberately
excluded from these sections to make the bill not only a consumer
protection statute but also a trade regulation statute.
The state attorneys and the Department of Legal Affairs share
enforcement powers under the Act and both are included in the de-
finition of "enforcing authority. ' ' 48 The state attorney enforces the pro-
visions of the Act if the violation occurs in or affects only his judicial
circuit and the Department has approved the requested enforcement
action. The state attorney also has jurisdiction to act if the Depart-
ment refers a complaint to his office. The Department enforces the
Act when a practice affects more than one judicial circuit; it may also
enforce the Act in one judicial circuit if the state attorney has failed
to take action on a violation within a reasonable period of time.4 9
A violation of the Act arises from a violation of any provision of
the Act or a violation of any rule promulgated pursuant to the Act.5 0
Section 501.204 prohibits any unfair or deceptive act, relying upon
60 years of precedent established by the federal courts and the Federal
Trade Commission for a precise definition of the proscribed conduct.
Thus if anyone engages in a deceptive or unfair act that is not specifical-
ly covered by a rule promulgated by the Cabinet, the enforcing au-
thority or an individual can still initiate action using federal precedent
as authority.
There are several exemptions from and limitations upon liability
for violations of the Act. Any person who disseminates information
(publishers, broadcasters and printers) without actual knowledge of
its illegality is not liable if such information is subsequently found to
be deceptive.5 1 A person engaging in an unfair or deceptive act is liable
only for damages directly related to the unfair or deceptive activity
and not for consequential damages to either person or property.5 2 A
47. These definitional terms were adopted from UNIFORM CONSUMER SALES PAcrIcEs
Acr § 2 in the first draft of the bill. However, when the Subcommittee on Consumer
Protection decided to expand the bill into a "little FTC" act, it failed to change the
definitional section of the bill to coincide with the new declaration of unlawful activity.
See appendix §§ 501.203-04.
48. FLA. STAT. § 501.203(4) (1973).
49. 1973 Fla. Att'y Gen. Op. 073-459; FLA. ADMIN. CODE § 2-8.02.
50. FLA. STAT. § 501.203(5) (1973).
51. FLA. STAT. § 501.212(2) (1973).
52. FLA. STAT. § 501.212(3) (1973), adopted from the UNIFORM CONSUMER SALES PRAC-
TICES Acr § 14, for which the official comment states:
1974)
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holder in due course who, in good faith and without notice of defenses,
accepts a note or contract is not liable for any unfair or deceptive act
committed by the assignor of the note or contract. 53
Certain industries were exempted from the provisions of the Act
on the premise that the state is currently regulating those industries.5'
Attempts were made to exclude all state-regulated industries, includ-
ing land sales, from the purview of the Act, but such a broad exclu-
sion was never adopted. The exemption provision states that "[a]ny
person or activity regulated under laws administered by the department
of insurance or the Florida Public Service Commission or banks and
savings and loan associations regulated by the Department of Banking
and Finance ' ' 55 are not subject to the provisions of the Act. Persons
regulated under laws administered by the Department of Insurance
include anyone who conducts insurance transactions in the state either
directly or indirectly.56 Industries regulated by the Public Service
Commission include private electric companies, telephone companies,
gas companies, common carriers, railroads, and private water and sew-
age systems.57 Banks and savings and loan companies regulated by the
Department of Banking and Finance include savings banks and in-
dustrial saving banks incorporated under Florida law,58 state banks
and commercial banks chartered by the state,59 any other bank in-
corporated or chartered under the laws of Florida,60 and savings and
loan associations incorporated or chartered under state law. 61 The
exemption provision does not apply to banks and savings and loan
associations chartered by the federal government since those institu-
tions are not regulated by the Department of Banking and Finance.
6 2
The Act does not preclude anyone from bringing a civil or criminal
action against someone committing a deceptive or unfair trade practice
This subsection has primary application to product liability claims. To the
extent that joinder is appropriate, it does not bar the joinder of a product liability
claim with a related claim for violation of this Act, § 15.
53. FLA. STAT. § 501.212(4) (1973).
54. See FLA. STAT. § 501.212(5) (1973).
55. FLA. STAT. § 501.212(5) (1973).
56. FLA. STAT. § 624.401 (1973). This exemption applies to deceptive insurance sales
practices for which a license can be revoked, but a person is not exempted from the Act
simply because he holds an insurance sales license.
57. FLA. STAT. chs. 350-68 (1973).
58. FLA. STAT. ch. 654 (1973).
59. FLA. STAT. ch. 656 (1973).
60. FLA. STAT. chs. 658-61 (1973).
61. FLA. STAT. ch. 665 (1973).
62. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(6) (1970). Federally chartered banks have been exempted from
the Federal Trade Commission Act; this may have had an effect upon Florida's Deceptive
and Unfair Trade Practices Act. See FLA. STAT. § 501.204(2) (1973).
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for violation of the plaintiff's common law or statutory rights. 3 In
addition, the Act clearly states that local consumer protection ordi-
nances not inconsistent with the Act are still valid and in force.
6 4
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS
A. The Need for Delegation
During the past 60 years, one of the more significant trends in
government at all levels has been the legislative branch's delegation
of its traditional powers and duties to the executive. To a certain ex-
tent, this delegation is necessitated by the complexities of modern
society. State legislatures, meeting for 60- to 90-day periods every one
or two years have found it difficult to specify by statute the elements
necessary to solve any particular public problem. One attractive solu-
tion has been to state a broad public policy, delegating to the executive
the necessary power to implement the policy in accordance with
specified standards or guidelines. This approach was adopted by the
Florida Legislature when it passed the Deceptive and Unfair Trade
Practice Act.
In the Florida marketplace numerous consumer and business trans-
actions occur every day. The ingenuity of the business community in
a rapidly changing market has resulted in the imposition of complicat-
ed terms and conditions upon many types of transactions. As a result,
the legislature saw the need to exercise its police power to eliminate
abusive business practices which injured consumers and businessmen
alike. Meeting for only two months of the year, the legislature found
it an impossible task to specify in statutory form every abusive business
practice occurring in the marketplace. Mr. Justice Brandeis best de-
scribed the legislature's problem when Congress first passed the
Federal Trade Commission Act:
Instead of undertaking to define what practices should be deemed
unfair, as had been done in earlier legislation, the act left the deter-
mination to the Commission. Experience with existing laws had
taught that definition, being necessarily rigid, would prove em-
barrassing and, if rigorously applied, would involve great hardship.
Methods of competition which would be unfair in one industry,
under certain circumstances, might, when adopted in another in-
dustry, or even in the same industry under different circumstances,
be entirely unobjectionable. Furthermore, an enumeration, how-
ever comprehensive, of existing methods of unfair competition must
63. FLA. STAT. § 501.213(1) (1973).
64. FLA. STAT. § 501213(2) (1973).
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necessarily soon prove incomplete, as with new conditions constant-
ly arising novel unfair methods would be devised and developed.65
B. Delegation Standards
This delegation of legislative power to the executive branch in
the Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act also has raised several
constitutional questions. The potential problems arise from the vague
language describing unlawful activity in section 501.204 and the
rule-making authority in section 501.205.
Two questions first must be answered. Is the act sufficiently explicit
to adequately inform those concerned of what activities are considered
unlawful? Are sufficient standards imposed on the executive to pre-
clude arbitrary actions? Section 501.204 states:
(1) Unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts
or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce are hereby
declared unlawful.
(2) It is the intent of the legislature that in construing subsec-
tion (1) of this section due consideration and great weight shall
be given to the interpretations of the Federal Trade Commission and
the federal courts relating to § 5(a)(1) of the Federal Trade Com-
mission Act (15 U.S.C. 45(a)(1)), as from time to time amended.
Subsection (1) is derived, almost verbatim, from the language used
in the Federal Trade Commission Act and several other state "little
FTC" acts.6  The federal courts and some state courts have held
such language sufficiently explicit to meet any vagueness test.67 The
65. FTC v. Gratz, 253 U.S. 421, 436-37 (1920) (footnotes omitted).
66. Lovett, State Deceptive Trade Practice Legislation, 46 TuL. L. REv. 724 (1972).
See note 13 supra.
67. See, e.g., State v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 501 P.2d 290 (Wash. 1972), appeal dis-
missed, 411 U.S. 945 (1973). There the Washington Supreme Court held that language
identical to that of FLA. STAT. § 501.204(1) (1973) was sufficiently explicit to satisfy consti-
tutional requirements:
Thus, in interpreting the language of RCW 19.86.020 we must hold that
phrases "unfair methods of competition" and "unfair or deceptive acts or practices"
have a sufficiently well established meaning in common law and federal trade law,
by which we are guided, to meet any constitutional challenge of vagueness.
... We hold that the phrases in question are not so vague as to violate sub-
stantive due process. We also hold that an act which is illegal and against public
policy is per se unfair within the meaning of RCW 19.86.020.
501 P.2d at 301.
In Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. FTC, 258 F. 307 (7th Cir. 1919), the Commission issued a
complaint against false and misleading advertising by Sears in its mail-order business.
The opinion discussed the charge that the FTC Act was unconstitutionally vague. The
court concluded that the words "unfair methods of competition" appearing in the Act
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Florida Supreme Court on two occasions, however, has invalidated
statutes using the term "unfair" and has stated that the term is too
vague to describe unlawful activity.6 The Deceptive and Unfair Trade
Practices Act appears to have met the void-for-vagueness problem by
imposing a standard that the executive must follow in implementing
the law. As a guide or standard to define "unfair" or "deceptive" trade
practices, subsection 501.204(2) adopts the decisions of the Federal
Trade Commission and the precedents of the federal courts in re-
viewing the Commission's decisions. The term "as from time to time
amended" of subsection (2) applies to amendments of the Federal
Trade Commission Act occurring before the legislature adopted the
new law.69 The legislature intended the standards of subsection (2)
to be fixed standards to meet the necessary constitutional require-
ments.70
were no more vague than other legal terms such as "due process of law" or "undue in-
fluence," and then observed that even in criminal statutes, "schemes to defraud" not
specifically listed can still be condemned by courts. Id. at 311. The court believed that
such a description of the proscribed conduct must be constitutionally acceptable because
statutes containing more specific definitions of the forbidden activities would be cir-
cumvented as soon as they were enacted by new, ingenious methods. Id.
The appellant had urged that the FTC Act was an unconstitutional delegation of
legislative and judicial power. The court responded:
With the increasing complexity of human activities . . . governmental control
can be secured only by the "board" or "commission" form of legislation. In such
instances Congress declares the public policy, fixes the general principles that are
to control, and charges an administrative body with the duty of ascertaining within
particular fields from time to time the facts which bring into play the principles
established by Congress. Though the action of the Commission in finding the
facts and declaring them to be specific offenses of the character embraced within
the general definition by Congress may be deemed to be quasi legislative, it is so
only in the sense that it converts the actual legislation from a static into a dynamic
condition. But the converter is not the electricity. And though the action of the
commission in ordering desistance may be counted quasi judicial on account of its
form, with respect to power it is not judicial, because a judicial determination is
only that which is embodied in a judgment or decree of a court and enforceable
by execution or other writ of the court.
Id. at 312.
68. See Robbins v. Webb's Cut Rate Drug Co., 16 So. 2d 121 (Fla. 1944); Conner
v. Joe Hatton, Inc., 216 So. 2d 209 (Fla. 1968).
69. One such amendment, the Wheeler-Lea Act of 1938, ch. 49, 52 Stat. 111 (1938),
as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1970), added the terms "unfair or deceptive acts or
practices" to the already existing "unfair methods of competition" language giving the
Federal Trade Commission power to protect consumers as well as competitors.
70. Cf. Florida Indus. Comm'n v. State, 21 So. 2d 599 (Fla. 1945). In State v. Reader's
Digest Ass'n, 501 P.2d 290 (Wash. 1972), appeal dismissed, 411 U.S. 945 (1973), the court
held that statutory language identical to that in FLA. STAT. § 501.204(2) (1973) did not
adopt existing federal rules and precedents. Rather the language
merely states that in construing the act the state courts are to be guided by the
interpretation given by federal courts to federal statutes dealing with similar
matters.
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Section 501.205 of the Act delegates rule-making authority to the
Florida Cabinet,71 such rules to prohibit with specificity "acts or
practices that violate" section 501.204. Again in section 501.205, the
legislature has imposed a standard or guide on the executive:
(2) All substantive rules and regulations promulgated under
this part shall be consistent with the rules, regulations and decisions
of the Federal Trade Commission and the federal courts in interpret-
ing the provisions of § 5(a)(1) of the Federal Trade Commission
Act (15 U.S.C. 45(a) (1)), as from time to time amended.
Although there is some difference between the wording of the stan-
dards imposed by sections 501.204 and 501.205, it appears the legisla-
ture intended to impose the same standard on both the rule-making
and the enforcing authorities.72 The standard imposed on the Cabinet's
rule-making power is the established decisions of the Federal Trade
Commission and the federal courts defining "unfair" or "deceptive."
The same standard is imposed upon the enforcing authority when
it brings an enforcement action pursuant to the provisions of sec-
tion 501.204. If this standard is sufficient in itself to preclude unbridled
discretionary action by the executive branch then the statute is a con-
stitutionally valid delegation of power:
The exact meaning of the requirement of a standard has never
been fixed. The exigencies of modern government have increasingly
dictated the use of general rather than minutely detailed standards
in regulating enactments under the police power. However, when
statutes delegate power with inadequate protection against un-
fairness or favoritism, and when such protection could easily have
been provided, the reviewing court should invalidate the legislation.
In other words, the legislative exercise of the police power should
be so clearly defined, so limited in scope, that nothing is left to
the unbridled discretion or whim of the administrative agency
charged with the responsibility of enforcing the act.
73
... Since federal judicial interpretations are guiding but not binding, we may
consider all relevant federal precedent, including that decided after the enactment
of RCW 19.86.920.
Id. at 301.
71. The Florida Cabinet is comprised of six individually elected members, chosen
every four years by a state-wide general election. See FLA. CONSr. art. IV, § § 4-5.
72. The function of the rule-making authority is to promulgate rules that specify
acts or practices that violate FLA.- STAT. § 501.204 (1973). Thus the standard used to
define "unfair" and "deceptive" trade practices in these rules and the standard to
guide the enforcing agency must be identical to ensure that the actions of the Cabinet
and the enforcing agency complement each other.
73. Dickinson v. State ex rel. Bryant, 227 So. 2d 36, 37 (Fla. 1969).
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The legislature may expressly authorize designated officials within
definite limitations to provide rules and regulations for the complete
operation and enforcement of the law within its express general pur-
pose, but it may not delegate the power to enact a law, or to declare
what the law shall be or to exercise an unrestricted discretion in
applying the law . . .74
The precedents established by the decisions of the Federal Trade
Commission and the federal courts in reviewing the Commission's
decisions incorporate several well-founded principles defining "unfair"
and "deceptive," principles that constitute a definite standard for the
executive to follow. Adoption of this guide does not leave the exe-
cutive branch any power to enact a law or to declare what the law
shall be. No executive official may fabricate his own definition of
"unfair" or "deceptive" apart from the principles established by the
Commission; the standard imposed is definite and complete. 75
V. FEDERAL PRECEDENTS
Because of the Florida Act's reliance upon federal enactments, and
to achieve a better understanding of the standard the legislature has
imposed on the executive branch, one needs to consider the Federal
Trade Commission's interpretations and decisions as well as the
federal courts' review of many of these decisions. Such a study is
no small task, since the Commission's reported decisions fill 81
volumes7 6 and the court decisions another 26 volumes.
77
One of the most active and visible areas of the Commission's work
is in the field of "unfair trade practices." In a recent attempt to define
more precisely an "unfair trade practice" the Federal Trade Com-
mission stated:
No enumeration of examples can define the outer limits of the
Commission's authority to proscribe unfair acts or practices, but
74. Husband v. Cassel, 130 So. 2d 69, 71 (Fla. 1961).
75. In State v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 501 P.2d 290 (Wash. 1972), appeal dismissed,
411 U.S. 945 (1973), the court seemed to give a more liberal interpretation of its "little
FTC" Act than is advocated here. The Washington court appeared to conclude that no
definite standard is needed for such a delegation of power because the terms "unfair"
and "deceptive" are already sufficiently well-defined.
76. Federal Trade Commission Decisions contains the full text of the Commission's
complaints, opinions and orders. The 81 volumes are available from the Government
Printing Office and can be found in the Florida State Library, Supreme Court Building,
Tallahassee, Florida, and in other federal depository libraries.
77. The Commerce Clearing House Trade Regulation Reporter (Trade Cases) con-
tains the complete text of all appellate court decisions concerning the Federal Trade
Commission Act and other antitrust legislation.
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the examples should help to indicate the breadth and flexibility of
the concept of unfair acts or practices and to suggest the factors
that determine whether a particular act or practice should be for-
bidden on this ground. These factors are as follows:
(1) whether the practice, without necessarily having been pre-
viously considered unlawful, offends public policy as has been es-
tablished by statutes, the common law, or otherwise-whether, in
other words, it is within at least the penumbra of some common-
law, statutory, or other established concept of unfairness;
(2) whether it is immoral, unethical, oppressive, or unscrupulous;
(3) whether it causes substantial injury to consumers (or com-
petitors, or other businessmen).
If all three factors are present, the challenged conduct will surely
violate Section 5 even if there is no specific precedent for pro-
scribing it. The wide variety of decisions interpreting the elusive
concept of unfairness at least makes clear that a method of selling
violates Section 5 if it is exploitive, or inequitable and if, in addi-
tion to being morally objectionable, it is seriously detrimental to
consumers or others. Beyond this, it is difficult to generalize.78
Other practices the Commission has found to be unfair include
bribery, payola, coercion, intimidation, scare tactics, competitor
harassment, inducing breach of a competitor contract, physical inter-
ference with a competitor's goods, deals or payments wrongfully
forced and shipment of unordered goods.7 9 If a trade practice, such
as a lottery, violates public policy then it is also an unfair trade prac-
tice.""
Another of the primary principles the Commission has developed
concerns the dissemination of misleading and deceptive materials or
advertising. The Commission has held that advertising may in fact
be deceptive even though no one was actually deceived."' The infor-
mation need only have the tendency to deceive; proof of actual decep-
tion is not essential.8 2 The misrepresentation, however, must be of a
material fact which would appreciably affect a consumer's decision
to buy. 3 It is immaterial that the business did not have knowledge
78. 29 Fed. Reg. 8324, 8355 (1964). See FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S.
233, 244 (1972).
79. 2 TRADE REG. REp. 7903, 7906, 7912, 7915, 7921, 7930, 7954.
80. Id. at 7939. See State v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 501 P.2d 290 (Wash. 1972),
appeal dismissed, 411 U.S. 945 (1973).
81. See, e.g., Charles of the Ritz Distrib. Corp. v. FTC, 143 F.2d 676 (2d Cir.
1944). See generally E. KINTER, A PRIMER ON THE LAW OF DECErIVE PRAcTncES 30-40
(1971).
82. Bockenstette v. FTC, 134 F.2d 369 (10th Cir. 1943).
83. FTC v. Mary Carter Paint Co., 382 U.S. 46 (1965).
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of the misrepresentation or knowledge of the advertisement's falsity3,
Nor is it a defense to deceptive advertising that the advertiser had
no intent to deceive.8 5 An advertisement containing the literal truth
may be deceptive if ignorant, unthinking or credulous consumers
could misinterpret its meaning.,6 The test is whether the advertisement,
as a whole, is misleading or deceptive even though the literal truth
may be disclosed.87 Ambiguous advertising which implies two mean-
ings, one of which is correct and the other of which is false, is con-
sidered deceptive.,
The Federal Trade Commission has also developed the principle
that, in order to eliminate deception and misrepresentation, the Com-
mission can require affirmative disclosures of certain information. The
disclosure may be required to clarify a statement or provision which,
standing alone, has the capacity to mislead. 9 In addition, a disclosure
will be required if it concerns a material fact relevant to the transac-
tion.90 A "material fact" is one which pertains to conditions or pro-
visions of the transaction considered highly important, or affecting the
likelihood of purchase.91 In the past, the Federal Trade Commission
has required disclosure of technical data of a product such as wattage
rating on light bulbs92 and octane rating of gasoline.93 Also, if a product
conceals its actual composition, its make-up must be affirmatively dis-
closed.94 A consumer's legal rights concerning contract cancellation,95
negotiability of commercial paper9 6 and return of unordered mer-
chandise9 7 must also be disclosed. The Commission has also required
full disclosure of contract terms in warranties, promissory notes, condi-
tional sales contracts and other instruments.98
Failure to perform in accordance with representations has been
84. D.D.D. Corp. v. FTC, 125 F.2d 679 (7th Cir. 1942).
85. Bockenstette v. FTC, 134 F.2d 369 (10th Cir. 1943).
86. Charles of the Ritz Distrib. Corp. v. FTC, 143 F.2d 676 (2d Cir. 1944).
87. See Kalwajtys v. FTC, 237 F.2d 654 (7th Cir. 1956).
88. E. KINTER, supra note 81, at 37.
89. Id. at 104.
90. J.B. Williams Co. v. FTC, 381 F.2d 884 (6th Cir. 1967). See E. KINTER, supra
note 81, at 104-14.
91. S.S.S. Co. v. FTC, 416 F.2d 226 (6th Cir. 1969).
92. 16 C.F.R. § 409 (1973).
93. 16 C.F.R. § 422 (1973); National Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v. FTC, 482 F.2d
672 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
94. See 2 TRADE REG. REP. % 7547.
95. 16 C.F.R. § 429 (1973).
96. 2 TRADE REG. REP. 7559; E. KINTER, supra note 81, at 112.
97. 2 TRADE REG. REP. 7559, n. .75.
98. 2 TRADE REG. REP. 7705; Tashof v. FTC, 437 F.2d 707 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Walter
Dlutz v. FTC, 5 TRADE REG. REP. (1969 Trade Cas.) % 72,687.
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declared an unfair and deceptive trade practice by the Federal Trade
Commission. The Commission has held that mail order companies
must deliver merchandise within a reasonable period of time or within
the time period they have represented to their customers.9 9 Failure
to perform on warranties is also considered an unfair and deceptive
trade practice.100 The Commission takes the position that representa-
99. In Bill Jordan, 59 F.T.C. 543 (1961), respondent was charged in a complaint
with, among other things, unduly delaying deliveries of photographs of new babies after
representing such prints would be delivered soon after the photographic session. The
complaint alleged such a representation was false, misleading and deceptive because the
respondent had either failed to deliver additional pictures for which the parents had
at least partially paid or had made only partial delivery. Moreover, the date of delivery
of many other orders had been several months later than the explicitly or implicitly
promised delivery date. Id. at 545. In its complaint the Commission alleged that re-
spondent's acts and practices were "to the prejudice and injury of the public and . . . of
respondent's competitors and constituted, and now constitute, un[fair and deceptive acts
and practices and unfair methods of competi]tion, in commerce, within the intent and
meaning of the Federal Trade Commission Act." Id.
A cease and desist order subsequently issued directed respondent to cease failing
to deliver pictures on the date he had promised delivery. A similar ruling was made in
Gadget-of-the-Month Club, 52 F.T.C. 225 (1955).
Other cases in which the FTC has labeled failure to perform as promised to be
an unfair trade practice include: Goodman v. FTC, 244 F.2d 584 (9th Cir. 1957) (failing
to make promised refunds); Mark Cummings, 57 F.T.C. 294 (1960) (failing to deliver
photographs within reasonable time); Superior Distrib. Corp., 54 F.T.C. 105 (1957)
(failing to deliver hot-drink vending machines on promised date); Community Services,
Inc., 53 F.T.C. 855 (1957) (failing to deliver high school annuals, promised for gradua-
tion, until many months later). One of the most blatant examples of failure to perform
as promised is illustrated by Tri-State Printers, Inc., 53 F.T.C. 1019 (1957). The respon-
dents in this case had enlisted various civic organizations to take orders for cookbooks,
date books and similar publications. They made representations that the products
would be delivered within a stated period of time (usually 30 to 90 days), but most
contracts remained unperformed for periods in excess of two years. Allegedly, deliveries
were made only after legal action was threatened. The FTC acknowledged that the
contracts included a clause disclaiming any promise not contained within them. The
Commission observed, however, that the contracts contained another clause requiring
the customer to place any additional orders within 90 days. The Commission found:
This is, in a manner, a form of verification of the oral statement of the
respondents' salesmen to the sponsoring group's signer of the contract that de-
livery will be made in 90 days and would no doubt be so construed by the average
woman who hastily read it in the high pressure atmosphere created by respondents'
salesmen.
Id. at 1032. This failure to deliver within the stated period or even within a reasonable
time "constitute[d] unfair methods of competition." Id. at 1036. Thus respondent was
ordered to ensure that any promised delivery dates would be met.
100. Failure to honor the terms of guarantee or warranty is normally treated as a
breach of contract. The Federal Trade Commission, when faced with such failures, has
labeled them unfair and deceptive trade practices.
In L.T. Baldwin, 59 F.T.C. 975 (1961), a seller and distributor of water heaters
was offering unconditional guarantees for the products he sold. The complaint alleged:
Respondent, in many cases, fails and refuses to perform under the terms of
his written guarantees where his product covered by the guarantee has failed
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tions or promises of future performance should not be made unless
the performance will actually take place as represented. It is immaterial
whether the promisor had the intent not to perform at the time he
made the promise or that his failure to perform resulted from manage-
ment problems.101
On rare occasions, the Federal Trade Commission has imposed a
contract provision on certain transactions between businessmen and
consumers. Such action is seldom taken unless the Commission has
felt it necessary to assist consumers experiencing an unconscionable
hardship. The Commission recently promulgated a rule giving con-
sumers an automatic three day "cooling-off" period in which to cancel,
without penalty, contracts solicited in the consumer's home.102
"Cooling-off" periods have also been allowed for contracts involving
future consumer services'"3 and, in some cases, limits have been placed
on the monetary value of such contracts. 0 In at least one case the
Commission has ordered a merchant to stop using negotiable instru-
ments which could be sold or otherwise disposed of, cutting off the
consumer's personal defenses. In a consent order, the Commission
during the period of the guarantee and he has been notified of such failure.
Id. at 976. The complaint urged that such practices
were, and are, all to the prejudice and injury of the public and of respondent's
competitors and constituted, and now constitute, unfair and deceptive acts and
practices and unfair methods of competition, in commerce, within the intent and
meaning of the Federal Trade Commission Act.
Id. at 977 (emphasis added).
In Infraglass Heater Co., 55 F.T.C. 124 (1958), a distributor of electric water heaters
was charged with failing to honor the guarantee that it advertised would accompany its
products. The Commission ordered respondent to cease and desist from
representing, directly or by implication, that their electric heaters, or other
merchandise, is guaranteed when any provision of the guarantee is not fully
complied with.
Id. at 126. This failure to honor the guarantee was clearly an unfair and deceptive
trade practice.
In Excel Products, Inc., 61 F.T.C. 1119 (1962), a distributor of storm windows and
doors, aluminum and fiberglass awnings, carpets, and patio covers was representing in
its advertisements that it "will make repairs or adjustments pursuant to the terms of
their guarantee." Id. at 1121. The complaint alleged:
Respondents in many instances do not make repairs or adjustments in ac-
cordance with their guarantee . . . [and the representations in their advertise-
ments] are false, misleading and deceptive.
Id. at 1121. Respondents were ordered to cease and desist from engaging in these
unfair and deceptive trade practices.
101. See cases cited in note 99 supra.
102. See 16 C.F.R. § 429.
103. 2 TRADE Rac. REP. 7845; Fred Astaire Dance Studio, Inc., 64 F.T.C. 1294
(1964); Arthur Murray, Inc., 57 F.T.C. 306 (1960).
104. See Arthur Murray Studio, Inc., 78 F.T.C. 401 (1971).
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directed the business to include the following provision in its
promissory notes:
"Notice"
"Any holder of this note shall take this note subject to all de-
fenses of any party which would be available in an action on a
simple contract." 10 5
Unfair methods of competition were the activities first prohibited
under the Federal Trade Commission Act. An "unfair method of
competition" is an activity which violates the "letter or the spirit" of
the federal antitrust laws. 10 6 The federal courts have determined that
a violation of either the Sherman, Clayton or Robinson-Patman anti-
trust acts is an unfair method of competition:
If the purpose and practice of the combination of garment manu-
facturers and their affiliates runs counter to the public policy declared
in the Sherman and Clayton Acts, the Federal Trade Commission
has the power to suppress it as an unfair method of competition.10 7
The Federal Trade Commission (as well as the enforcing authority
under the Florida Act) has authority to enforce the provisions of the
antitrust laws even though the Congress (legislature) did not
specifically give the Commission (enforcing authority) enforcement
powers under such laws. 10 8 In defining an unfair method of competi-
tion the federal courts have stated that a combination or conspiracy
is not necessarily an essential element in the unlawful activity:
While we hold that the Commission's findings of combination
were supported by evidence, that does not mean that existence of
a "combination" is an indispensable ingredient of an "unfair
method of competition" under the Trade Commission Act.109
105. Southern Aluminum Discount Co., 75 F.T.C. 223, 230 (1969). See FTC v. Sperry
: Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 244 (1972); All-State Industries, Inc. v. FTC, 423 F. 2d 423
(4th Cir. 1970); FTC Statement of Policy, October 3, 1969, 2 TRADE REG. REP. 7845, at
12662; 29 Fed. Reg. 8324, 8355 (1964).
106. A violation of either the letter or spirit of the antitrust laws is considered an
unfair method of competition. FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233 (1972);
Fashion Originators' Guild of America, Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941); FTC v. Beech-
Nut Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441 (1922).
107. Fashion Originators' Guild of America, Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 463 (1941).
108. See FTC v. Motion Picture Adv. Serv. Co., 344 U.S. 392 (1953); Butterick
Publishing Co. v. FTC, 85 F.2d 522 (2d Cir. 1936).
109. FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683, 721 (1948).
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However, an unfair method of competition does require some show-
ing of effect on competitors:
[T]he word "competition" imports the existence of present or po-
tential competitors, and the unfair methods must be such as in-
juriously affect or tend thus to affect the business of the competitors-
that is to say, the trader whose methods are assailed as unfair must
have present or potential rivals in trade whose business will be, or
is likely to be, lessened or otherwise injured. 110
Therefore, the federal precedents clearly show that price-fixing, tying
arrangements, combinations in restraint of trade and other anti-
competitive activities are "unfair methods of competition" within the
legislative definition of the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade
Practices Act.
VI. RULE MAKING
The legislature included rule-making powers in the new Act to
"prohibit with specificity acts or practices that violate this part."'
The rule-making power was delegated to the Department of Legal
Affairs and the Cabinet, with the Department proposing rules and
the Cabinet accepting or rejecting them by majority vote.1 2 Under
Florida's Administrative Procedure Act, the actual rule-making authori-
ty is the Cabinet 1 and therefore the Cabinet must hold the required
public hearings before adopting any rules." 4 Since the statute requires
the Department of Legal Affairs to propose the rules,' it is the De-
partment's responsibility to establish a basis for the rules and to pre-
pare a proposed draft for public review prior to final adoption by
the Cabinet.
The Department's first step in the establishment of criteria for
the initial rules was to hold public hearings throughout the state to
obtain information on consumer and trade problems and to deter-
mine in what areas remedial action was required. 1" 6 This information
would supplement information already compiled from the thousands
110. FTC v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643, 649 (1931).
111. FLA. STAT. § 501.205 (1973).
112. FLA. STAT. § 501.205 (1973).
113. FLA. STAT. § 120.021 (1973).
114. FLA. STAT. § 120.041 (1973).
115. FLA. STAT. § 501.205 (1973).
116. Public hearings were held in the cities of St. Petersburg, Tampa, Miami, Or-
lando, Jacksonville, Pensacola, West Palm Beach and Ft. Lauderdale during July, August
and September of 1973. Additional hearings were held in Tallahassee from October 22 to
26. 1973.
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of consumer complaints which the Attorney General, the office of the
Governor and the Division of Consumer Services of the Department
of Agriculture had received. 117 After compiling this information, the
Department concluded that the Florida marketplace was experiencing
the following major problems:
(1) A significant amount of information disseminated to the
general public in the advertising of goods, services and property was
deceptive, misleading or false;
(2) Many sellers of property, goods and services had failed to
disclose to the consumer material aspects of the transaction;
(3) Sellers of property, goods and services would often make
promises of performance or delivery to consumers and subsequently
fail to perform as promised;
(4) Numerous contracts between consumer and seller later created
unconscionable hardships on the consumer; and
(5) Some sellers of property, goods and services engaged in prac-
tices which were unlawful, oppressive or unethical resulting in dam-
age not only to consumers but also to the seller's competitors.118
To solve these consumer market problems, the Department could
have initiated any of several programs. One direct approach could
have been to initiate a case-by-case enforcement plan based upon the
established precedents of the Federal Trade Commission. This ap-
proach, however, would have been inadequate. The Department is
not the only enforcement authority under the Act since both the
state attorneys and individuals may initiate enforcement action. 19 It
is questionable whether consumers, state attorneys and businessmen
are familiar with the precedents of the Federal Trade Commission
defining "unfair" and "deceptive" trade practices. With these prob-
lems in mind, it became apparent that the better approach would be
to reduce the Federal Trade Commission precedents to rule form
covering the major trade-practice problems in Florida. With the adop-
tion of uniform rules, any enforcing entity would be guided by the
same criteria in defining an unfair or deceptive practice.
A. Cabinet Rules
In proposing the trade practice rules, the Department was re-
quired by the Act to make such rules "consistent" with rules, regu-
lations and decisions of the Federal Trade Commission.s The Cabinet
117. For an explanation of the responsibilities of the consumer agencies in Florida
prior to the "little FTC" act, see ENGLAND REPORT 29.
118. See ENGLAND REPORT 321.
119. FLA. STAT. §§ 501.203(4), 501.211 (1973).
120. FLA. STAT. § 501.205(2) (1973).
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in adopting the rules recommended by the Department of Legal
Affairs, has promulgated many of the rules under the Federal Trade
Commission principle entitled "misleading and deceptive." This
standard was used in the rules concerning salesl 21 use of the word
"free," 122 game promotions' 2 3 motor vehicle leasing,' 2' sale of mobile
homes,1 25 sale of land,126 sale of condominiums" 7 distributorship agree-
ments,"2 private-school selling methods' 29 and sale of motor vehicles. 3 °
One of the cornerstone provisions of the Cabinet-promulgated
rules is the requirement that a seller or his agent affirmatively disclose
material facts relevant to the consumer's decision to purchase.
Disclosures required under the rules include conditions for receiving
free gifts, 31 availability of service," 2 conditions of renting apartments
or mobile home park lots, 3  mobile home warranties' 4 closing costs
on real property,135 air conditioning operating efficiencies,"3 terms of
home improvement contracts,"37 terms of condominium sales agree-
ments,"8 cancellation rights on contracts for future consumer services"89
and estimates for auto repair.140
The Cabinet's rules adopt the Federal Trade Commission's
principle concerning failure to perform as promised or represented in
the area of rental housing,'4' mobile home parks,"' mobile home war-
ranties, 14' land sales,' home construction,'" condominium sales, 14
121. FLA. ADMIN. CODE § 2-9.02.
122. FLA. ADMIN. CODE § 2-9.03.
123. FLA. ADMIN. CODE § 2-9.07.
124. FLA. ADMIN. CODE § 2-10.02.
125. FLA. ADMIN. CODE § 2-12.05.
126. FLA. ADMIN. CODE §§ 2-13.02(1), 2-13.03.
127. FLA. ADMIN. CODE § 2-16.04(2).
128. FLA. ADMIN. CODE § 2-17.04.
129. FLA. ADMIN. CODE §§ 2-18.11 to .14.
130. FLA. ADMIN. CODE § 2-19.05.
131. FLA. ADMIN. CODE § 2-9.06.
132. FLA. ADMIN. CODE § 2-9.10.
133. FLA. ADMIN. CODE §§ 2-11.02, 2-11.05.
134. FLA. ADMIN. CODE § 2-12.02.
135. FLA. ADMIN. CODE § 2-13.03.
136. FLA. ADMIN. CODE § 2-14.03.
137. FLA. ADMIN. CODE § 2-15.02.
138. FLA. ADMIN. CODE § 2-16.02.
139. FLA. ADMIN. CODE § 2-18.02.
140. FLA. ADMIN. CODE § 2-19.02.
141. FLA. ADMIN. CODE § 2-11.06.
142. FLA. ADMIN. CODE § 2-11.06.
143. FLA. ADMIN. CODE § 2-12.03.
144. FLA. ADMIN. CODE §§ 2-13.02(2)-(4), 2-13.02(6).
145. FLA. ADMIN. CODE § 2-15.03.
146. FLA. ADMIN. CODE § 2-16.04(1).
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distributorship agreements1 7 and auto repair.
1 48
The Cabinet adopts the Commission's principle concerning im-
position of contract terms in only one area. The rule on contracts
for future consumer services allows cancellation of the contract under
certain conditions to avoid unconscionable hardships to consumers. 49
The rule also requires an escrow account for funds received from the
sale of services sold prior to their availability, thus assuring that con-
sumers will not be obligated to pay for something they do not re-
ceive.150
The rules adopted pursuant to the Act also incorporate the Federal
Trade Commission's standard of unfairness. The rules prohibit a
landlord from renting buildings in violation of health codes,151 from
coercing or harrassing tenants by unlawful entry 52 and from retaliating
against tenants by eviction. 5 3 In addition, referral selling5 4 and multi-
level selling practices 5  are prohibited.
B. Judicial Guidelines
When an administrative agency in Florida has been delegated rule-
making power by the legislature, it must promulgate those rules within
the guidelines established by the courts. The rules cannot exceed the
authority conferred by the governing statute. 5 6 In other words, the
rules under the Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act must fall
within the standards imposed upon the executive officers by the legis-
lature in the passage of the Act. As previously discussed, these standards
are the decisions of the Federal Trade Commission and the federal
courts' review of such decisions. 57 If the Cabinet's rules under the
Act follow these imposed standards, it appears they will be within the
authority the legislature has delegated to the executive branch.
Normally, where the enabling statute states a broad public policy, the
courts have tended to favor the assumption that the promulgated rule
falls within the statutory authority.5 8
147. FLA. ADMIN. CODE § 2-17.04(14).
148. FLA. ADMIN. CODE §§ 2-19.03, 2-19.05(7).
149. FLA. ADMIN. CODE § 2-18.03.
150. FLA. ADMIN. CODE § 2-18.07.
151. FLA. ADMIN. CODE § 2-11.03.
152. FLA. ADMIN. CODE § 2-11.04.
153. FLA. ADMIN. CODE § 2-11.07.
154. FLA. ADMIN. CODE § 2-17.02.
155. FLA. ADMIN. CODE § 2-17.03.
156. See FLA. STAT. § 120.031 (1973); Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. State, 143 So. 255
(Fla. 1932).
157. See FLA. STAT. § 501.205(2) (1973).
158. The numerous decisions construing FLA. STAT. chs. 350-69 (1973), relating
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Another court-imposed guideline on administrative rules is that
rules may not conflict with existing Florida statutes, 59 including the
enabling statute. The courts take a more conservative approach when
dealing with the enabling statute, holding that the rule cannot amend,
repeal or modify the act which gave the rule-making authority. °60 Case
law indicates, however, that an administrative rule may supplement a
statute provided it does not conflict with that statute.'" If a rule covers
the same subject area as another statute, this in itself should not in-
validate the rule. 6 2 Since the legislative intent of the Act is to give
"great weight and authority" to the decisions of the Federal Trade
Commission and to the federal courts' review of such decisions, it
would appear that the Cabinet could promulgate rules covering
various subjects, regardless of the reach of other statutes, as long as the
rule satisfies the standard. 6 3 Some of the federal decisions upon
which the Florida Act relies have held that the violation of a law
outside the Federal Trade Commission's jurisdiction could be declared
an unfair trade practice and enforced by the Commission.' "
The Florida courts also require that any administrative rule bear
a reasonable relation to the conduct being regulated.' 6' The rule must
to the powers of the Public Service Commission, exemplify the principle. See, e.g.,
Utilities Operating Co. v. Mayo, 204 So. 2d 321 (Fla. 1967). The Florida Supreme Court
seldom overturns the decisions of the PSC even though this body exercises its delegated
broad powers with wide discretion.
159. See St. Petersburg Kennel Club v. Baldwin, 38 So. 2d 436, 438 (Fla. 1949);
cf. Grissom v. Van Orsdel, 137 So. 2d 246, 247 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1962).
160. See Diamond Cab Owners Ass'n v. Florida R.R. & Pub. Util. Comm'n, 66 So.
2d 593, 596 (Fla. 1953).
161. If an administrative rule or regulation is both authorized by statute and "reason-
able," it is presumed valid. Florida Citrus Comm'n v. Golden Gift, 91 So. 2d 657, 660
(Fla. 1956). With these standards as the only requirements for a valid regulation, some
overlapping is bound to occur in the rules, since many of the enabling statutes them-
selves overlap and supplement each other. For example, the broad grant of authority to
the Department of Pollution Control, see FA. STAT. § 403.061 (1973), must of necessity
supplement the powers and duties of the Department of Natural Resources, see FLA.
STAT. § 370.021 (1973).
162. A review of Florida's statutes reveals that laws exist to regulate alnost every
conceivable trade. The courts have held that one governmental agency's control over
an area does not preempt another agency's action. See, e.g., State v. Tampa Electric Co.,
291 So. 2d 45 (Fla. 2nd Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
163. The subjects of FLA. ADMIN. CODE chs. 2-11 (rental housing and mobile homes),
2-13 (sale of real property), 2-16 (condominiums and cooperatives), are already regulated
by FLA. STAT. chs. 83, 478, 711 (1973), respectively. The Cabinet's rules, however, do
not conflict with these statutes and, therefore, appear to be valid. If the legislature had
intended to restrict the Cabinet's rule-making powers, it simply could have included
subject areas in its list of exemptions, FLA. STAT. § 501.212 (1973). See notes 52-62 supra.
164. See cases cited in note 108 supra.
165. See, e.g., Florida Citrus Comm'n v. Owens, 239 So. 2d 840, 848 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 1969).
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establish standards or guidance for those members of the public who
are affected by it. The state supreme court has stated:
Where a statute and a rule . . . are in accord with the terms
and purposes of the State Constitution, the ultimate test of their
validity as affording due process of law and equal protection of the
laws, as guaranteed by the federal Constitution, is the reasonableness
of the statute and the rule with reference to their effect upon prop-
erty rights. 166
In addition, the rule-making authority must show adequate reasons
for regulating an area or industry, and cannot adopt a rule without
actual authority to do so or adopt a rule which punishes a person
affected by it without due process of law. 1 7 To be reasonable, a rule
must be designed to accomplish the purpose of the statute. 66 Even
though an administrative rule may have the effect of destroying a
business, it is not, per se, unreasonable and invalid. 69 If, for example,
the substantive purpose of a business is an unlawful multilevel or
pyramid sales practice, the Cabinet's rule concerning such activities
should not be invalid, even though the operation of the business may
be curtailed or eliminated. 70
Another important administrative rule-making principle concerns
the exercise of any implied powers that exist under the statute. Im-
plied powers may be derived from the expressed legislative purpose
of the statute.'7' The powers of administrative agencies include those
expressly given and those implied as necessary by the provisions of
the statutes. As a rule of construction, neither category is possessed of
greater dignity or effect. 7 2
The legislature's rejection of previous bills is not indicative of a
legislative intent to preclude rule making in the defeated bill's sub-
ject area. 7 3 During the last few years numerous consumer protection
bills have been introduced in the legislature only to fail at the
committee level or in floor debate. They addressed such areas as
166. State v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 47 So. 969, 983 (Fla. 1908).
167. Robbins v. Webb's Cut Rate Drug Co., 16 So. 2d 121 (Fla. 1944).
168. Gillett v. Florida Univ. of Dermatology, 197 So. 852 (Fla. 1940).
169. Id. at 857.
170. See FLA. ADMIN. CODE ch. 2-17.
171. See FLA. STAT. § 501.202 (1973); Deltona Corp. v. PSC, 220 So. 2d 905 (Fla.
1969).
172. City Gas Co. v. Peoples Gas Sys., 182 So. 2d 429, 436 (Fla. 1965), afl'g 167 So. 2d
577 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1964); Cassaday v. Sholtz, 169 So. 487, 490 (Fla. 1936); Martin
County v. Hansen, 149 So. 616, 618 (Fla. 1933).
173. Cf. Vocelle v. Knight Bros. Paper Co., 118 So. 2d 664 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1960).
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auto repair' 7 4 health spas, 17 5 dance studios76 and condominiums.' 7'
These particular bills covered areas where numerous abusive, decep-
tive and unfair trade practices have occurred. If an administrative
agency were precluded from promulgating rules in areas previously
rejected by the legislature, it could spend a great deal of its time
searching for old bills from previous sessions to determine the extent of
its jurisdiction. Such wasteful activities could render enforcement
of the law extremely difficult, if not impossible.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act is a dra-
matic new approach to trade regulation and consumer protection
in Florida even though the concept was adopted by the federal govern-
ment over 60 years ago. The new Act adopts the federal precedents
and principles defining "unfair" and "deceptive" and applies them
to the major trade problems in Florida. These principles can be
summarized as follows:
(1) Any dissemination of information which has the tendency to
deceive is unlawful.
(2) All material facts of a transaction must be affirmatively dis-
closed.
(3) Failure to perform reasonably in accordance with representa-
tions is unfair and deceptive.
(4) Certain contract provisions, such as the right of contract can-
cellation during a "cooling-off" period, must be allowed to avoid un-
conscionable hardships to consumers.
(5) Any practice that is within the penumbra of unlawful activity
as established by statute or common law, is oppressive and unethical
and is damaging to consumers or competitors constitutes an unfair
trade practice.
(6) Any practice which violates the letter or spirit of the federal
antitrust laws is an unfair method of competition regardless of whether
interstate commerce is involved.
The new Act delegates considerable, but well defined, powers to
the Florida Cabinet, the Attorney General and the state attorneys,
and creates private rights of action for private citizens. By declaring
a broad public policy that "unfair methods of competition," "un-
fair" trade practices and "deceptive" trade practices shall all be un-
174. See, e.g., Fla. H.R. 94, 247 (1973).
175. See, e.g., Fla. S. 486 (1973).
176. See, e.g., Fla. S. 76 (1973).
177. See, e.g., Fla. S. 386 (1973).
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lawful, the legislature established a comprehensive and identifiable
standard to counter those who would cheat and deceive the public
and competitors in the quest for additional profit. Such a broad dele-
gation of power was necessary to deal effectively with Florida's market
problems. By imposing the federal precedents in defining this state-
ment of public policy, the legislature constitutionally delegated en-
forcement and rule-making powers to the executive branch. Such dele-
gation of power gives the executive the needed authority to make
Florida's marketplace fairer to consumers and businessmen alike.
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APPENDIX*
AMENDMENTS TO FLORIDA UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTIcES Acr
A bill to be entitled
An act relating to unfair and deceptive trade practices, repealing parts III and IV
of chapter 817, creating part II of chapter 501, Florida Statutes, to prohibit
deceptive and unfair trade practices and to provide civil and administrative remedies
for consumers, state attorneys and the department of legal affairs; creating section
570.283(10), Florida Statutes, giving certain authority to the division of consumer
services of the department of agriculture; providing for certain exceptions; provid-
ing an effective date.
Be It Enacted by the Legislature of the State of Florida:
Section 1. Part 11 of chapter 501, Florida Statutes, consisting of sections 501.201, 501.-
202, 501.203, 501.204, 501.205, 501.206, 501.207, 501.208, 501.209, 501.210, 501.211, 501.-
212, and 501.213, and 501.214 is created to read:
501.201 Short title.-This part shall be known and may be cited as the Florida de-
ceptive and unfair trade practices act.
501.202 Purposes, rules of construction.-The provisions of this part shall be con-
strued liberally to promote the following policies:
(1) To simplify, clarify, and modernize the law governing consumer sales practices;
(2) To protect consumers from suppliers who commit deceptive and unfair trade
practices; and
(3) To make state regulation of consumer sales practices consistent with established
policies of federal law relating to consumer protection.
501.203 Definitions.-As used in this chapter, unless the context otherwise requires,
the term:
(1) "Consumer transaction" means a sale, lease, assignment, award by chance, or
other disposition of an item of goods, a consumer service, or an intangible, to an in-
dividual for purposes that are primarily personal, family, or household, or that relate
to a business opportunity that requires both his expenditure of money or property and
his personal services on a continuing basis and in which he has not been previously en-
gaged, or a solicitation by a supplier with respect to any of these dispositions;
(2) "Final judgment" means a judgment, including any supporting opinion, that
determines the rights of the parties and concerning which appellate remedies have
been exhausted or the time for appeal has expired;
(3) "Supplier" means a seller, lessor, assignor, or other person who regularly solicits,
engages in, or enforces consumer transactions, whether or not he deals directly with the
consumer;
(4) "Enforcing authority" means the office of the state attorney if a violation of this
part occurs in or affects the judicial circuit under the office's jurisdiction, and the de-
partment of legal affairs if the violation occurs in or affects more than one (1) judicial
circuit, or if the office of state attorney fails to act upon a violation solely within his
judicial circuit within a reasonable period of time after it has been brought to his atten-
tion. if a complaint of such violation has been referred to the state attorney by the de-
partment of legal affairs. "Enforcing authority" means the department of legal affairs
if the violation occurs in or affects more than one judicial circuit, or if the office of state
attorney fails to act upon a violation within a reasonable period of time after it has
been referred to him by the department of legal affairs.
0 In this appendix, the language in italics indicates provisions of the original draft
of the bill that were excluded by various amendments. Wording that is underlined
indicates those provisions of the bill which were added by various amendments. Language
in the text that is in either plain or underlined type is the final wording of the bill as
signed by the Governor, but does not reflect minor changes effected in compiling the
1973 edition of the Florida statutes. See FLA. STAT. § 11.242(5) (1973).
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(5) "Rule making authority" means the department of legal affairs;
(5) (6) "Violation of this part" means either a violation of a provision of this part
or a violation of any rule promulgated pursuant to this part;
(6) (7) "Department" means the department of legal affairs;
(7) (8) "Order" means a cease and desist order issued by the enforcing authority as
set forth in section 501.208;
(8) (9) "Interested party or person" means any person affected by a violation of this
part or any person affected by an order of the enforcing authority.
501.204 Unlawful acts and practices.-
(1) Fraudulent methods of competition and fraudulent or deceptive acts or practices
in the conduct of any trade or commerce are hereby declared unlawful.
(1) A deceptive act or practice by a supplier in connection with a consumer transaction
violates this act whether it occurs before, during, or after the transaction.
(2) Without limiting the scope of subsection (1), but as examples of conduct in viola-
tion thereof, the term, "unfair or deceptive acts or practices" shall include but not be
limited to any one of the following oral or written acts or representations:
(a) That the subject of a consumer transaction has sponsorship, approval, performance
characteristics, accessories, uses, or benefits it does not have;
(b) That the subject of a consumer transaction is of a particular standard, quality,
grade, style or model, if it is not;
(c) That the subject of a consumer transaction is new, or unused, if it is not, or that
the subject of a consumer transaction has been used to an extent that is materially
different from the fact;
(d) That the subject of a consumer transaction is available to the consumer for a
reason that does not exist;
(e) That the subject of a consumer transaction has been supplied in accordance with
a previous representation, if it has not;
(f) That the subject of a consumer transaction will be supplied in greater quantity
than the supplier intends;
(g) That replacement or repair is needed, if it is not;
(h) That a specific price advantage exists, if it does not;
(i) That the supplier has a sponsorship, approval, or affiliation he does not have;
(j) That a consumer transaction involves or does not involve a warranty, a dis-
claimer of warranties, particular warranty terms, or other rights, remedies, or obliga-
tions if the indication is false;
(A) That the consumer will receive a rebate, discount or other benefit as an induce-
ment for entering into a consumer transaction in return for giving the supplier the
names of prospective consumers or otherwise helping the supplier to enter into other
consumer transactions, if receipt of the benefit is contingent on an event occuring [sic] after
the consumer enters into the transaction.
(1) That the supplier took advantage of the inability of any person to reasonably
protect his interests because of physical infirmity, ignorance, illiteracy, inability to
understand the language of an agreement, or similar factors;
(m) That when the consumer transaction was entered into the price grossly exceeded
the price at which similar property or services were readily obtainable in similar trans-
action by like consumers;
(n) That when the consumer transaction was entered into the consumer was unable
to receive a substantial benefit from the subject of the transaction; or
(o) That when the consumer transaction was entered into the supplier had knowledge
that there was no reasonable probability of payment of the obligation in full by the
consumer.
(3) It is the intent of the legislature that in construing this section of this part due
consideration and great weight shall be given to the interpretations of the Federal Trade
Commission and the federal courts relating to § 5(aXl) of the Federal Trade Commission
Act (15 U.S.C. 4 5(aXl)), as from time to time amended.
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(1) Unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the
conduct of any trade or commerce are hereby declared unlawful.
(2) It is the intent of the legislature that in construing subsection (1) of this section
due consideration and great weight shall be given to the interpretations of the Federal
Trade Commission and the federal courts relating to § 5(a)(1) of the Federal Trade
Commission Act (15 U.S.C. 45(a)(1)), as from time to time amended.
501.205 Rule making power-of the department of legal affairs.
(1) The department shall adopt rules that prohibit with specificity acts or practices
that violate this part and which prescribe procedural rules for the administration of this
part. All rules prescribed and administrative action taken by the department shall be
pursuant to chapter 120 unless otherwise specified in this part.
(1) The department shall propose rules to the cabinet that prohibit with specificity
acts or practices that violate this part and which prescribe procedural rules for the ad-
ministration of this part. Such rules shall be adopted by majority vote of the cabinet.
All rules prescribed by the cabinet and administrative action taken by the department
shall be pursuant to chapter 120, Florida Statutes. The attorney general shall, at least
thirty days (30) before the meeting at which such rules are to be considered by the
cabinet, mail a copy of such rules to any person filing a written request with the at-
torney general to receive copies of proposed rules. The attorney general may charge a
reasonable rate for providing copies of such rules, which rate shall not exceed the
actual cost of printing and mailing.
(2) All substantive rules and regulations promulgated under this part shall be con-
sistent with the rules, regulations and decisions of the Federal Trade Commission and
the federal courts in interpreting the provisions of § 5(a)(1) of the Federal Trade Com-
mission Act (15 U.S.C. 45(a)(1)), as from time to time amended.
501.206 Investigative powers of the enforcing authority.-
(1) If, by his own inquiries or as a result of complaints, the enforcing authority has
reason to believe that a person has engaged in or is engaging in or is about to engage
in an act or practice that violates this part, he may administer oaths and affirmations,
subpoena witnesses or matter, and collect evidence according to the Florida Rules of
Civil Procedure.
(2) If matter that the enforcing authority seeks to obtain by subpoena is located
outside the state, the person subpoenaed may make it available to the enforcing authority
or his representative to examine the matter at the place where it is located. The enforcing
authority may designate representatives, including officials of the state in which the
matter is located, to inspect the matter on his behalf, and he may respond to similar
requests from officials of other states.
(3) Upon failure of a person without lawful excuse to obey a subpoena and upon
reasonable notice to all persons affected, the enforcing authority may apply to the
circuit court for an order compelling compliance.
(4) The enforcing authority may request that an individual who refuses to comply
with a subpoena on the ground that testimony or matter may incriminate him be
ordered by the court to provide the testimony or matter. Except in a prosecution for
perjury, an individual who complies with a court order to provide testimony or matter
after asserting a privilege against self-incrimination to which he is entitled by law,
may not be subjected to a criminal proceeding or to a civil penalty with respect to the
consumer transaction concerning which he is required to testify or produce relevant
matter.
501.207 Remedies of the enforcing authority.-
(1) The enforcing authority may bring:
(a) An action to obtain a declaratory judgment that an act or practice violates this
part;
(b) An action to enjoin a supplier who has violated, is violating, or is otherwise likely
to violate this part; or
(c) An action on behalf of one or more consumers for the actual damages caused
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by an act or practice performed in violation of this part; provided, however, that no
damages shall be recoverable under this section against a retailer who has, in good
faith, engaged in the dissemination of claims of a manufacturer or wholesaler without
actual knowledge that it violated this part.
(d) Before bringing an action under paragraphs (a) or (c) of this subsection, the
enforcing authority shall pursuant to an administrative hearing determine that there
is probable cause to bring the action. Written notice of such hearing shall be served
by certified mail upon the party charged with a violation of this part at least thirty (30)
days prior to such hearing. The party charged shall have the right to file a written
answer to the charges at any time prior to the hearing and shall have the right to be
represented by counsel at such hearing and to cross-examine all complaining witnesses.
The administrative hearing shall be held in the county in which the party charged re-
sides or in the county in which the violation is alleged to have occurred.
(2) Upon motion of the enforcing authority or any interested party in any action
brought under subsection (1), the court may make appropriate orders, including appoint-
ment of a master or receiver or sequestration of assets, to reimburse consumers found
to have been damaged, or to carry out a consumer transaction in accordance with
consumers' reasonable expectations, or to strike or limit the application of clauses of
contracts to avoid an unconscionable result, or to grant other appropriate relief. The
court may assess the expenses of a master or receiver against a supplier.
(3) If a supplier shows that a violation of this part resulted from a bona fide error
notwithstanding the maintenance of procedures reasonably adapted to avoid the error,
recovery under this section is limited to the amount, if any, by which the supplier was
unjustly enriched by the violation.
(4) No action may be brought by the enforcing authority under this section more
than two (2) years after the occurrence of a violation of this part, or more than one (1)
year after the last payment in a consumer transaction involved in a violation of this
part, whichever is later.
(5) The enforcing authority may terminate an investigation or an action upon
acceptance of a supplier's written assurance of voluntary compliance with this part.
Acceptance of an assurance may be conditioned on a commitment to reimburse con-
sumers or take other appropriate corrective action. An assurance is not evidence of a
prior violation of this part. However, unless an assurance has been rescinded by agree-
ment of the parties or voided by a court for good cause, subsequent failure to comply
with the terms of an assurance is prima facie evidence of a violation of this part. No
such assurance shall act as a limitation upon any action or remedy available to a person
aggrieved by a violation of this part.
501.208 Cease and desist orders; procedures.-
(1) Whenever the enforcing authority shall have reason to believe that a person has
been or is violating this part and if it shall appear to the enforcing authority that a
proceeding by it in respect thereof would be to the interest of the public, it shall
issue and serve upon such person a complaint or notice stating its charges in that respect
and containing a notice of a hearing upon a day and at a place therein fixed at least
thirty (30) days after the service of said complaint. Said hearing shall be held in the
county of residence of the party charged or in the county in which the violation is
alleged to have occurred. The person so complained of shall have the right to appear at
the place and time so fixed and show cause why an order should not be entered by
the enforcing authority requiring such person to cease and desist from the violation of
this part so charged in said complaint. Any interested party or person may make ap-
plication and upon good cause shown may be allowed by the enforcing authority to
intervene and appear in said proceeding by counsel or in person. The testimony in any
such proceeding shall be reduced to writing and filed in the office of the enforcing au-
thority. If upon such hearing the enforcing authority shall be of the opinion that the
act is in violation of this act, it shall make a report in writing in which it shall state
its findings as to the facts and shall issue and cause to be served on such person an order
requiring such person to cease and desist from using such method of competition or such
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act or practice. The person affected by the order has ten (10) days from the date of
issuance of the order to file a petition for review with the attorney general. When a
petition for review is filed, the attorney general shall either affirm, modify or set aside
the order within forty-five (45) days after the filing date of the petition for review.
(2) The enforcing authority may modify or set aside its order at any time by rehearing
upon its own motion when such rehearing is in the interest of the public welfare.
(3) Judicial review of orders of the enforcing authority shall be by certiorari to the
district courts of appeal in accordance with the provisions set forth in section 120.31 of
part III of the Administrative Procedure Act, chapter 120, Florida Statutes, and shall
take precedence over other civil cases pending, and shall be in every way expedited.
(4) If the alleged violation of this part occurs in a county or municipality having an
ordinance covering such unlawful activity with appropriate administrative proceedings
to enforce the ordinance then the enforcing authority may initiate any cease and desist
action according to the procedural rules of the ordinance, and may hold administrative
hearings before the boards or bodies created by the ordinance; however, any appeal of a
local administrative body's decision shall be to the attorney general with judicial review
through the district court of appeals as provided for in this section.
(5) An order of the enforcing authority to cease and desist shall not become effective
until ten (10) days after all administrative action has been concluded, or, if appeal
is made to the district court of appeal and bond is posted, until a final order has
been entered by that court.
(6) No cease and desist order shall act as a limitation upon any other action or
remedy available to a person aggrieved by a violation of this act.
(7) When a court remands an order of the enforcing authority for rehearing, such
rehearing shall be held within forty-five (45) days after the remand.
(8) Any person who violates a cease and desist order of the enforcing authority
after it has become final, and while such order is in effect, shall forfeit and pay to the
state of Florida a civil penalty of not more than five thousand dollars ($5,000) for each
violation, which shall accrue to the state of Florida and may be recovered in a civil
action brought by the state. Each separate violation of such an order shall be a separate
offense, except that in the case of a violation through continuing failure or neglect to
obey a final order of the enforcing authority each day of continuance of such failure or
neglect shall be deemed a separate offense.
501.209 Other supervision.-If the enforcing authority receives a complaint or other
information relating to noncompliance with this act by a supplier who is subject to
other supervision in this state, the enforcing authority shall inform the official or agency
having that supervision.
501.2091 Jury trial.-Nothwithstanding anything in this act to the contrary, any per-
son made a party to any proceeding brought under the provisions of this act by any
enforcing authority may obtain a stay of such proceedings at any time by filing a civil
action requesting a trial on the issues raised by the enforcing authority in the circuit
court in the county of said party's residence. All parties shall be bound by the final
order of the said circuit court.
501.210 Attorney fees.-
(1) In any civil litigation resulting from a consumer transaction involving deceptive
and unfair transactions in a violation of this part, except as provided in subsection (5)
(6), the prevailing party, after judgment in the trial court and exhaustion of all appeals,
if any, shall receive his reasonable attorney's fees and costs from the nonprevailing party.
(2) The attorney for the prevailing party shall submit a sworn affidavit of his time
spent on the case, and his costs incurred for all the motions, hearings and appeals to the
trial judge who presided over the civil case.
(3) The trial judge shall award the prevailing party the sum of reasonable all costs
incurred in the action plus a reasonable legal fee for the hours actually spent on the
case as sworn to in an affidavit.
(4) The trial judge may not award attorney's fees in excess of the amount of the
judgment for the prevailing party.
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(4) (5) Any award of attorney's fees or costs shall become a part of the judgment
and subject to execution as the laws of Florida allow.
(5) (6) This section shall not apply to any action initiated by the enforcing authority.
501.211 Other individual remedies.-
(1) Without regard to any other remedy or relief to which a person is entitled, anyone
aggrieved by a violation of this part may bring an action to obtain a declaratory judg-
ment that an act or practice violates this part, enjoin a supplier who has violated, is
violating, or is otherwise likely to violate this part.
(2) In any individual action brought by a consumer who has suffered a loss as a
result of a violation of this part, such individual may recover actual damages or one
hundred dollars ($100), whichever is greater, plus attorney's fees and court costs as
provided in section 501.210; provided, however, that no damages, fees or costs shall be
recoverable under this section against a retailer who has, in good faith, engaged in the
dissemination of claims of a manufacturer or wholesaler without actual knowledge that
it violated this part.
(3) In any action brought under this section, upon motion of the party against
whom such action is filed alleging that the action is frivolous, without legal or factual
merit, or brought for the purpose of harassment, the court may, after hearing evidence
as to the necessity therefore, require the party instituting the action to post a bond in
the amount which the court finds reasonable to indemnify the defendant for any dam-
ages incurred, including reasonable attorney's fees; provided, however, that this subsec-
tion shall not apply to any action initiated by the enforcing authority.
501.212 Class actions.-
(1) Regardless of whether a consumer is entitled to recover damages or has any other
remedy under this part, he may bring a class action for the actual damages caused by a
violation of this part. If a supplier shows by a preponderance of the evidence that a
violation of this part resulted from a bona fide error notwithstanding the maintenance
of procedures reasonably adapted to avoid the error, recovery under this section is limited
to the amount, if any, by which the supplier was unjustly enriched by the violation.
(2) If damages are awarded for a violation of this part and not all members of the
class can be located with due diligence under procedures and within a time period set
by the court, any portion of the award attributable to such members shall escheat to
the state.
(3) The prevailing party or parties in a class action may recoup attorney's fees under
section 501.210 against the parties of record in the law suit, but not all non-party members
of the class.
(4) The court may, in its discretion, award punitive damages and may provide such
equitable relief as it deems necessary or proper, including enjoining the defendant from
further violations of the part. If it appears to the court that the suit brought by the
plaintiff was ill-founded or brought for purposes of harassment, the initiating parties
shall be liable for court costs and reasonable attorney's fees incurred by the defendant.
(5) Except for consent judgments entered before testimony is taken, a final judgment
in favor of the enforcing authority is admissible as prima facie evidence of the facts on
which it is based in later proceedings under this section against the same person or a
person in privity with him.
(6) An action under this section must be brought within two (2) years after occurrence
of a violation of this part, within one (1) year after the last payment in a consumer
transaction involved in a violation of this part, or within one (1) year after the termina-
tion of proceedings by the enforcing authority with respect to a violation of this part,
whichever is later.
(7) When a supplier sues a consumer, the consumer may assert as a counterclaim
any claim under this part arising out of the transaction on which suit is brought.
(8) An action may be maintained as a class action under this part only if:
(a) The class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable;
(b) There are questions of law or fact common to the class;
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(c) The claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or
defenses of the class; and
(d) The representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the
class.
(9) No action brought as a class action under this part may be dismissed because:
(a) More than one (1) remedy at law exists for the members of the class; or
(b) The consumer transactions involved are not identical.
501.213 501.212 Application.-This part does not apply to:
(1) An act or practice required or specifically permitted by federal or state law;
(2) A publisher, broadcaster, printer, or other person engaged in the dissemination of
information or the reproduction of printed or pictorial matter insofar as the informa-
tion or matter has been disseminated or reproduced on behalf of others without actual
knowledge that it violated this part;
(3) A claim for personal injury or death or a claim for damage to property other
than the property that is the subject of the consumer transaction; or
(4) The credit terms of a transaction otherwise subject to this part.
(4) The holder in due course of a negotiable instrument or the transferee of a credit
agreement received in good faith without knowledge of a violation of this part.
(5) Any person or activity regulated under laws administered by the department of
insurance or the Florida Public Service Commission or banks and savings and loan
associations regulated by the Department of Banking and Finance.
501.21.4 501.213 Effect on other remedies.-
(1) The remedies of this part are in addition to remedies otherwise available for the
same conduct under state or local law, except that a class action relating to a transaction
governed by this part may be brought only as prescribed by this part.
(2) A person alleged to have violated this part has the burden of showing, as a defense
in any action brought against him, the inapplicability of this part.
(2) (3) This part is supplemental to and makes no attempt to preempt local consumer
protection ordinances not inconsistent with this part.
Section 2. Section 570.283, Florida Statutes, is amended by adding subsection (10) to
read:
570.283 Division of consumer services; director; processing of complaints; records.-
(10) If the division by its own inquiry, or as a result of complaints, has reason to
believe that a violation of the laws of the state relating to consumer protection has
occurred or is occurring, it may conduct an investigation, subpoena witnesses and evi-
dence, and administer oaths and affirmations.
Section 2. Section 3. Part III consisting of sections 817.69, 817.70, 817.71, 817.72, 817.73,
817.74, 817.75, and 817.751 and part IV consisting of sections 817.76, 817.77, 817.771, 817.-
78, 817.79, 817.80, 817.81, 817.82, 817.83, 817.84 and 817.85 of chapter 817, Florida Statutes,
are repealed.
Section 3. Section 4. If any provision of this part or the application thereof to any
person or circumstance is held invalid, the invalidity shall not affect other provisions
or applications of this part which can be given effect without the invalid provision or
application, and to this end the provisions of this part are severable.
Section 4. Section 5. This part shall take effect on October 1, 1973.
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